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DECONSTRUCTING THE POLITICS OF BEING YELLOW 
 
By LeeAnn O’Neill* 
I  like to stop by the office of my favorite undergraduate pro-fessor at the George Washington University, a Japanese American professor of Japanese Language and Literature 
with strong opinions on just about everything.  Sometimes we 
talk about the things we could not talk about when he was my 
professor; other times, we simply talk.  This time, we discussed 
why he thought Asian Americans were so politically inactive, 
especially given their seemingly advantageous position in soci-
ety.  Our consensus was that Latinos have found an identity uni-
fying multiple ethnic groups, otherwise known as a pan-ethnic 
identity, that Asian Americans have not.  I originally stopped by 
his office with the intention of soliciting an article on this very 
topic from him.  Instead, he challenged me to write this article 
myself. 
 A couple weeks later, I was drinking coffee with one of my 
more politically savvy friends, a prominent Chinese American K 
Street attorney.  Recalling my conversation with my professor, I 
asked him who some of the prominent Latinos are in politics that 
he could think of off the top of his head.1  He swiftly replied Al-
berto Gonzales, Antonio Villaraigosa, Mel Martinez, Anthony 
Romero, and Bill Richardson.2  Then I asked him the same thing 
about prominent Asian Americans in politics.3  I was stunned to 
hear his answer –“Norman Mineta, that Hawaiian guy…does 
Connie Chung count?”4  It was at that moment I knew this article 
would come to fruition.  
INTRODUCTION 
 The 2000 census reported that at 12.6% of the total popula-
tion, Latinos outnumbered African Americans as the largest mi-
nority group in the United States.  Asian Americans numbered 
only 3.6%.5  In 2003, however, Asian Americans had the highest 
median income of any racial group, including Caucasians, at 
$63,251.6  Conversely, Latinos tied African Americans for the 
lowest median income at $34,272.7  Given Asian Americans’ 
history of disenfranchisement, continued discrimination by main-
stream America, and vast potential economic power, why has 
there been such little political coalition building among Asian 
Americans?  Why have Latinos, with a similar history of disen-
franchisement and discrimination, successfully banded together 
politically to bring many Latino political figures to prominence? 
 Critical race theorists argue that race is a social and legal 
construction, a political device to keep people of color subordi-
nated beneath mainstream America.8  Race refers to a “vast 
group of people loosely bound together by historically contin-
gent, socially significant elements of their […] ancestry.” Race 
should be understood as a unique social phenomenon that con-
nects physical features to the essence of a social group.9  As 
such, mainstream America replaces ethnic identity with broad 
labels such as Latino and Asian American.10  Consequently, so-
called racial groups like Latinos and Asian Americans exist as 
social and political constructs against mainstream America.   
 This essay argues that although mainstream America views 
Asian Americans as a pan-ethnic political unit, in reality, there is 
no viable Asian American political identity today.11  Why could 
Latinos use this construct to create a secondary identity outside 
of their ethnicity and establish a political coalition?  In contrast, 
why did Asian Americans rebuff this racial construct?  This es-
say attempts to illustrate why the politics of being Asian Ameri-
can has failed in comparison to the relatively successful politics 
of being Latino.  Acknowledging the importance of the social 
aspect of pan-ethnic identity, the scope of this essay specifically 
focuses on political manifestations against or in support of racial 
constructions. 
THE FACTORS THAT FUEL PAN-ETHNIC POLITICAL   
IDENTITIY 
 General coalition building requires that a group consist of 
like-minded people whose backgrounds, experiences, or posi-
tions in the social structure make them receptive to the ideas of a 
new political movement.12  Pan-ethnic political group identity, 
however, has two separate sources for coalition-building:  (1) 
physical characteristics which induce mainstream America to 
treat members of separate ethnicities the same, transcending eth-
nicity or nationality and (2) social characteristics such as lan-
guage, education discrimination, and job discrimination.13  
THE ORIGINS OF THE LATINO POLITICAL IDENTITY:    
THE CASE OF CHICAGO AND THE UNLIKELY POLITICAL 
UNION BETWEEN MEXICAN AMERICANS AND        
PUERTO RICANS 
 
“Mexicans see Puerto Ricans as U.S. Citizens who come to this 
country with a lot of privileges and we don’t take advantage of 
those privileges.”14  
– Interview with Puerto Rican in Chicago 
 
“The thing with Mexicans is that they know they are wetbacks.”15 
– Interview with Puerto Rican in Chicago 
 
“Mexicans don’t go on welfare; welfare is for Blacks, Americans, 
and Puerto Ricans, because they’re lazy.”16  
– Interview with Mexican American in Chicago 
 
 Chicago’s Latino population is dominated by two ethnic 
groups: Mexican Americans, who comprise approximately 70% 
of the Latino population, and Puerto Ricans, who make up ap-
proximately 15% of the Latino population.17  Mexican Ameri-
cans and Puerto Ricans in Chicago have a history of intense dis-
crimination and stereotyping against each other; for example, the 
Southside Mexican American stereotype versus the Humboldt 
Park Puerto Rican gangster stereotype.  For Chicago Latinos, a 
Mexican American should never identify or associate with 
 Puerto Ricans or vice versa.18  Even semantics of language, the 
most apparent commonality between the two groups, was a sali-
ent source of division.  Rather than unifying Spanish speakers, it 
became a mechanism for self-stratification based on competing 
notions of proper upbringing and civility.19   
 Contrary to such tensions and isolation, the development 
and success of a Latino coalition reflects the unified response of 
Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans to common discrimina-
tion by mainstream America.  The affirmative action policy that 
emerged out of the 1964 and 1968 Civil Rights Acts laid the 
foundation for the formation of a pan-
ethnic Latino political coalition.20  
Chicago corporations’ blanket job 
discrimination against Mexican 
Americans and Puerto Ricans gave 
birth to the Spanish Coalition for Jobs 
in the 1970s, which strove to enforce 
the affirmative action statutes.21   “At 
the center of Latino ethnic affinity and 
mobilization were the structural and 
circumstantial conditions of working-
class solidarity” and collective oppres-
sion.22  Under these conditions, the 
political coalition in Chicago between 
Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans grew to encompass 
broader issues based on their common socio-economic status 
within the Black-White paradigm, including bilingual education 
and work-sponsored “English as a Second Language” classes.  
 Chicago illustrates the political reaction of Mexican Ameri-
cans and Puerto Ricans to mainstream American discrimination 
against Latinos as a racial group.  Mexican Americans and 
Puerto Ricans found common ground in the “political ethnicity” 
of being Latino, “a manipulative device for the pursuit of collec-
tive political, economic, and social interests in society.”23  Job 
discrimination manifested itself as discrimination against Span-
ish speakers as a racial group for the corporations in Chicago.  
The common thread of speaking Spanish was not the basis of the 
coalition, but rather a tool for strengthening their group con-
sciousness.24  Thus, Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans in 
Chicago remained Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans first, 
but together, they identified as Latino. 
THE LATINO POLITICAL IDENTITY TODAY:                 
THE CASE OF LOS ANGELES AND THE ELECTION OF 
ANTONIO VILLARAIGOSA 
 Los Angeles is home to one of the most diverse populations 
in the United States, with a population of 48% Latino, 31% Cau-
casian, 11% Asian American, and 10% African American.25  On 
May 17, 2005, Mexican American Antonio Villaraigosa beat 
incumbent mayor James Hahn as the first Latino mayor of Los 
Angeles in over a century.  Villaraigosa found broad support 
across all key demographics: racial, ethnic, economic, and geo-
graphic groups.  Time Magazine hailed his election as a symbol 
of “a bridge-building, post-ethnic style of politics.”26  Post-
election news coverage, however, glossed over the importance 
of the fact that an overwhelming 84% of registered Latinos 
voted for Villaraigosa.  The 2000 Census indicated that while 
about a million Mexican Americans reside in Los Angeles, well 
over half a million Latinos are from other countries of origin, 
making Mexican Americans 63% of Los Angeles’ Latino popu-
lation.27  For the non-Mexican American Latinos in Los Ange-
les, Villaraigosa may have been just a Latino mayoral candidate; 
even though in the broad context of the election he was more 
than just that. 
       In Villaraigosa’s failed 2001 bid 
for mayor, he garnered nearly the 
same percentage of the Latino vote as 
the 2005 election.  Furthermore, in 
2005, he generated a record voter turn-
out among Latinos in Los Angeles.28  
Pre-election data reflects that a domi-
nating 82.4% of registered Latino vot-
ers in Los Angeles indicated that they 
would participate in the runoff elec-
tion.29  Approximately 41% of regis-
tered Latino voters in the United 
States indicated that they are more 
likely to vote if there is a Latino on the 
ballot.30  Nearly a quarter of these voters would pick a Latino 
candidate even when a more qualified non-Latino candidate 
appears on the ballot.31  In other words, a vast majority will vote 
for a Latino candidate if running against an equally qualified 
non-Latino candidate.32  Consequently, the perception of Vil-
laraigosa as a Latino candidate in the eyes of Latinos played a 
large role in the participation and voting patterns of Latinos in 
Los Angeles. 
 Just as job discrimination became a uniting force in Chi-
cago, the primaries indicated that Latino voters favor candidates 
who talk about their issues and reach out to them.33  Although 
some Latino voters admitted to voting for Villaraigosa because 
he was “one of their own,” his platform spoke to the top three 
issues for Latinos - education, health care, and labor.34  Rather 
than focusing on his Mexican American heritage, which he 
wears proudly, he identified with his constituents as someone 
who grew out of poverty and championed the collective socio-
economic interests held by Latinos in Los Angeles.35  Instead of 
using language as a basis of unity, he used it as a political tool.  
He appealed to the Latino vote with appearances on Univision 
and adopted Cesar Chavez’s mantra “Si, se puede,” which 
means, “It can be done,” as his campaign slogan.36   
 Villaraigosa’s victory illustrates the growth of the Latino 
political entity from a citywide campaign to a nationwide phe-
nomenon.  Mainstream America fears the sleeping voting super-
power of Latinos and Villaraigosa’s victory has heightened that 
fear.37  Latinos across the nation see Villaraigosa’s victory as 
one for Latinos, not just for Mexican Americans.  His victory 
symbolizes the new Latino political power in the Democratic 
Party.38  The Latino political movement has turned him into a 
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 tool of the movement, motivating and facilitating the advance-
ment of other Latinos.  Consequently, Villaraigosa has paved the 
way for future political candidates labeled as Latinos to draw on 
his success.  
THE ORIGINS OF ASIAN AMERICAN POLITICAL          
DISUNITY: THE CASE OF VINCENT CHIN 
 In 1982, two Caucasian males murdered Chinese American 
Vincent Chin in Detroit because he looked Japanese.  At a time 
when Japan was a looming economic superpower, the two men 
sympathized with Congressman John Dingell’s angry speech in 
Congress blaming “little yellow men” for the demise of Ameri-
can automakers and blamed Chin, as a 
yellow man, for the loss of American 
car manufacturing jobs.39  The Chi-
nese American community was not 
only shocked by the nature of the hate 
crime, but by the fact that the murder-
ers only received a sentence of proba-
tion.  The nation had yet to recognize 
the concept of a hate crime.40   
 Chinese American organizations 
developed the first pan-Asian political 
entity, the American Citizens for Jus-
tice (“ACJ”), with some support from Japanese American, Ko-
rean American, and Filipino American organizations.  The ACJ 
became the first explicitly Asian American civil rights advocacy 
effort with a national scope.41  This was an ambitious attempt 
given Asian Americans’ tendency to disassociate themselves 
from harassed Asian American groups.   
 Historically, Asian Americans have only attempted to es-
chew the generic yellow label.  For example, during the World 
War II internment of the Japanese Americans, Chinese Ameri-
cans hung signs saying “This is a Chinese shop” and Korean 
Americans hung signs claiming that “We Hate Japs Worse Than 
You Do.”42  This antagonism reflected recent Chinese American 
and Korean American immigrants’ backlash against the imperi-
alist policies of Japan against China and Korea back home.  
More recently, in the aftermath of the 1992 riots and ravaging of 
Koreatown in Los Angeles, there was a striking absence of other 
Asian Americans during the peace march to demand the rebuild-
ing of Koreatown.43  A Chinese American editor for the Los 
Angeles Times voiced what no one else wanted to admit out loud 
– she did not march because she was afraid of being mistaken 
for Korean.44 
 The ACJ had only limited success and the movement in 
Detroit waned.  The Chin saga ended with the return of Chin’s 
mother to China in 1987, disgusted with the United States legal 
system for acquitting both murderers of all charges.45  The ACJ 
was only successful because the Chin murder shed light on a 
horrible truth; Asian Americans did not have a choice in mis-
taken identity.  In the eyes of mainstream America, if the alleged 
enemy is Korean, then all yellow people are Korean.  If the al-
leged enemy is Japanese, then all yellow people are Japanese.  If 
Chin had been Japanese and murdered because he was Japanese, 
would Asian Americans have come together to fight the injus-
tice of giving probation for murder?  It is troubling that the po-
litical coalition of Asian Americans has weakened without an 
imminent civil rights threat based on mistaken identity. 
 Unlike the Latinos in Chicago, Asian Americans in Detroit 
found very little common political ground beyond the color of 
their skin and the shape of their eyes to propel the movement 
forward.46  The Immigration Act of 1965 ushered in a new gen-
eration of Asian Americans, including Chinese, Korean, Fili-
pino, and South Asian immigrants in Detroit.  The new regula-
tions heavily favored educated professionals and a new Asian 
American middle class composed of 
the children of the laundry and restau-
rant owners who had completed col-
lege by the 1980s.47   
         This upward movement in soci-
ety removed common factors like pov-
erty and socio-economic status as 
goals for political unity and conse-
quently, removed factors that would 
help keep the ACJ a viable organiza-
tion.  Unlike Latinos, who as a group 
suffer from a growing occupational 
divide with respect to mainstream America, Asian Americans 
have surpassed the success of mainstream America as a group.48  
Furthermore, Asian Americans in Detroit lacked certain tools of 
coalition such as the Latinos’ power as the largest minority and 
their common language.  Asian Americans were vastly outnum-
bered, comprising less than 1.5% of metropolitan Detroit’s 
population.49   
 It is worth noting that South Asian Americans were the 
largest Asian American group in Detroit.50  Although South 
Asian Americans supported the ACJ, they comprised a very 
small part of the organization.  For example, South Asian 
Americans were not identified as participating in street demon-
strations, which consisted mostly of Chinese Americans, with 
some support from Korean Americans, Japanese Americans, and 
Filipino Americans.51  Why?  Possibly because South Asian 
Americans, with their own distinct physical characteristics, were 
less likely to be mistaken for Japanese.  The trend towards the 
social construct of Asian Pacific American as a distinct group 
from South Asian American is logical given the purpose for 
which Asian Americans created the ACJ.   
THE ASIAN AMERICAN IDENTITY TODAY:                  
THE CASE OF OREGON AND THE ELECTION OF       
DAVID WU 
 The United States Senate has two Asian American Senators.  
Both, unsurprisingly, are from Hawaii, the only state where 
Asian Americans make up the highest proportion of the total 
population.52  There are only five Asian Americans in the United 
States House of Representatives.53  In 1998, David Wu became 
the first Taiwan-born American elected to Congress.  He was 
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 sworn into his fourth term on January 4, 2005 as the Representa-
tive for Oregon.  Oregon is only 2% Asian American.54   
 Like other Asian American political candidates, Wu 
avoided playing the race card and ran on a platform appealing to 
Oregon voters of all backgrounds, including education, health-
care, and social security.55  In fact, it is likely he alienated Chi-
nese American supporters in the 2000 election when he voted 
against Permanent Normal Trade Relations with China.  Many 
Chinese Americans voted for him in 1998 simply because he 
was Chinese American and crossed party lines to do so.56  When 
it became clear Wu was not a candidate for Chinese Americans, 
they crossed back over the party lines during his re-election.  
His campaign website mentions his ethnicity in one small para-
graph at the end of his biography.57  A family photo with his 
blonde, Caucasian wife is juxtaposed against this paragraph, as 
if to offset the fact he is Taiwanese American. 
 Even more revealing is the lack of a reaction to the 1998 
election.  Asian Americans have not turned the election of David 
Wu into a symbol of the emergence of Asian Americans in poli-
tics.  The media coverage did not hail it as a new day for Asian 
Americans.  Chinese American voters felt that regardless of 
Wu’s election, Asian Americans still lacked political clout and 
that “whatever we thought, it probably didn’t make that much of 
a difference.”58  Unlike Villaraigosa, who followed “the rule of 
thumb for race politics” by mobilizing “his people” and swing-
ing enough votes among “other people,” Wu was elected with 
“no people” by swinging all of Portland.59   
 David Wu’s election demonstrates that “Asian Americans 
are united more by the label that others put on them than by lan-
guage, religion or ethnic or national ties.”60  Unlike the Latino 
political movement, language does not exist as a tool for coali-
tion.  Although Asian Americans experience discrimination, it 
does not have as great an impact on their socio-economic status.  
For example, the U.S. Census Bureau estimates that 50% of 
Asian Americans over age twenty-five have at least a bachelor’s 
degree in comparison to the overall average of 27%.61  Stereo-
types of Asian Americans as the model minority are not as de-
bilitating as the stereotypes for Latinos.  Race politics are in-
creasingly becoming a moot point due to the relatively minute 
size of the Asian American population and its economic and 
social diversity.62  As Asian American communities become 
more diverse, they become increasingly divided on political is-
sues.  An especially significant rift has arisen between the 
“liberal Asian American establishment” and the relatively new 
Asian American neo-conservative movement.63  Additionally, 
“[m]any new Asian immigrants […] are coming to the United 
States with no sense of Asian American solidarity and little un-
derstanding of the Asian American history of oppression.”64   
CONCLUSION 
 Asian Americans have learned that the key to political suc-
cess is not in race politics or the promotion of a pan-ethnic po-
litical identity, but rather to divorce themselves from their 
Asian-ness and focus on broader appeal.  Even in areas domi-
nated by Asian Americans such as South Pasadena, they have 
never played race as a political card.  As an Asian American city 
councilor in South Pasadena said, “I never campaign as an 
Asian.  I campaign as a concerned citizen.”65  As the United 
States becomes more diverse, lingering reasons for an Asian 
American political coalition will become outdated.  Asian 
Americans will quietly continue their growth on the political 
scene, generating issue-based, but not race-based appeal.  The 
continued diversification of the Asian American community 
signals the death knell of any lingering Asian American political 
unity.  Unless Asian Americans can find a new common ground, 
the answer will likely remain, “Does Connie Chung count?” 
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